Executive Compensation at Lehman Brothers
Numéro de cas : 9 100 2014 006
Date :
2014-10-29
Notes pédagogiques incluses :
Oui
Résumé
This case studies executive compensation at Lehman Brothers prior to the investment bank’s bankruptcy, in 2008, which played a key role in the worst global financial crisis in 70 years. Using information on the compensation of top executives at Lehman Brothers, the objective is to determine whether key decision-makers had incentives to take excessive risks, or whether their incentives were largely aligned with those of the bank’s shareholders.
Objectifs pédagogiques
The objective is to determine whether key decision-makers at a leading financial institution had incentives to take excessive risks, or whether their incentives were largely aligned with those of the bank’s shareholders.
Discipline principal :
Éthique des affaires
- Gouvernance
Discipline secondaire :
Finance
Secteurs d'activité :
Banques et services financiers
Type :
Cas traditionnel (Cas descriptif)
Lieu de l'événement :
New York City
Année de début de l'événement :
2008
Année de fin de l'événement :
2008
Taille de l'entreprise :
Multinationale
Concepts et théories en lien avec le cas
- Executive compensation
- Risk taking
- Incentives
- Principal-agent problem
- Financial stability